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Herbert Hausmaninger *
The Committee of Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR**
Introduction
Prior to the introduction of a Committee of Constitutional Supervision
of the USSR (Komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR) by constitutional
amendment (article 125) on December 1, 1988, Soviet political theory
had generally rejected the idea ofjudicial review over the constitutional-
ity of legislation as incompatible with the fundamental "supremacy" of
parliament.' Constitutional supervision in the USSR had been assigned
to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a standing body of the infre-
quently meeting Soviet parliament. Under article 121(4) of the 1977
Constitution, the Presidium had the power to "ensure observance of the
Constitution of the USSR and conformity of the Constitutions and laws
of Union Republics to the Constitution and laws of the USSR." In the
"period of stagnation" preceding Gorbachev's perestroika, there was
rarely a need to apply this provision.2 Recent conflicts between repub-
lics and the central government, however, have led the Presidium to
issue a number of decrees voiding new republic legislation, including
amendments to republic constitutions that violated the Constitution of
the USSR or federal law.
3
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** This article was submitted on Feb. 21, 1990. It reflects the author's appraisal
of the legal and political situation up to that date. Note, however, that on Mar. 14,
1990, a special session of the Congress of People's Deputies adopted the "USSR Law
on the Establishment of the Post of President of the USSR and the Introduction of
Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)." Izvestiia
No. 75, Mar. 16, 1990, at 2, col. 1. Some of these changes also affect the Committee
of Constitutional Supervision.
1. Ludwikowski,Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current Developments, 37
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 89 (1988).
2. See Topornin, Konstitutsiia v sotsialisticheskom pravovom gosudavstve [The Constitu-
tion in the Socialist State Under the Rule of Law], in SOTSIALISTICHESKOE PRAVOVOE
GOSUDAVSTVO [THE SOCIALIST STATE UNDER THE RULE OF LAw] 24, 35 (B. N.
Topornin ed. 1989) [hereinafter B. N. Topornin ed.].
3. This function is now exercised by the Presidium under art. 119(5) of the Con-
stitution as amended on Dec. 1, 1988. KONST. SSSR [CONSTrruTION OF THE USSR]
(1988), reprinted in 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. No. 1, 75, 97 (1989). For a long list of repub-
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Before 1988, Soviet legal scholars had debated various models of
constitutional supervision in an attempt to create a special state organ to
resolve conflicts of this type. They considered formation of a special
committee attached to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or to the
Soviet of Nationalities, assignment of the function of constitutional
supervision to the Supreme Court of the USSR, and creation of a sepa-
rate constitutional court. None of these models was ultimately adopted.
The first model, a special committee at the Presidium or one of the
chambers of the Supreme Soviet, found very little support because it
would have assigned a merely auxiliary and dependent role to the insti-
tution of constitutional supervision. Although Hungary had adopted
this model in 1984, 4 Soviet scholars and politicians apparently were pre-
pared to develop a stronger instrument.
The second model, a special division of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court of the USSR also elicited a cool reception. Although the Supreme
Court possessed the professional competence to handle the legal
aspects of constitutional supervision,5 as it had to a limited extent under
the 1924 Constitution, 6 the Soviet jurists rejected this model. They
argued that the Supreme Court's composition and structure seemed to
render it incapable of assuming new functions. 7 One should probably
not quarrel with this explanation. There are, indeed, good reasons why
Western European states like Austria or Germany have not entrusted
constitutional jurisdiction to ordinary courts staffed with career civil ser-
vice judges trained mostly in civil and criminal law. The special function
of constitutional review requires the participation of more independent-
minded legal scholars and practitioners, some of whom should have
acquired political experience and all of whom should have a keen per-
ception of the political quality that differentiates constitutional interpre-
tation from ordinary legal decision making.8
The third model, a separate constitutional court with special juris-
diction in which experts endowed with independence would adjudicate
conflicts in a judicial procedure, appeared very attractive to Soviet legal
scholars. This model, however, clashed with the deeply ingrained prin-
ciple of "supremacy" of parliament; the former Supreme Soviet and the
present Congress of People's Deputies were to be the highest organs of
state power in the USSR and, as such, beyond judicial review.9 At least
for the time being, this model was rejected as being too radical, even
lic legislation voided by the Presidium on Nov. 10, 1989, see Izvestiia No. 318, Nov.
13, 1989, at 1, 3 and 41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 46, Dec. 13, 1989, at 5-7.
4. Kuss, New Institutions in Socialist Constitutional Law: The Polish Constitutional Tri-
bunal and the Hungarian Constitutional Council, 12 REV. SOCIALIST L. 343, 358-60 (1986).
5. Cf. Temushkin in the Literaturnaia Gazeta roundtable discussion What Should a
Law-Governed State Be? on June 8, 1988, in 28 Soy. L. & Gov'T No. 1, 51, 56 (1989).
6. Topornin, supra note 2, at 35.
7. Id.
8. Cf Denninger, Judicial Review Revisited: The German Experience, 59 TUL. L. REV.
1013, 1017 (1985).
9. Topornin, supra note 2, at 36.
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though Poland had created a Constitutional Court in 1985 whose func-
tions, like those of the present Soviet Committee of Constitutional
Supervision, duly respect the supremacy of parliament.' 0
The Soviet constitutional amendments of December 1, 1988, estab-
lished a Committee of Constitutional Supervision ("CCS") that corre-
sponds to none of the above-mentioned models. 11 On December 23,
1989 the Congress of People's Deputies revised article 125 of the Con-
stitution, passed a Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR, and
elected the Chairman (Professor Sergei S. Alekseev) and Deputy Chair-
man (Professor Boris M. Lazarev) of the CCS. Twenty five members of
the CCS are to be elected at the next session of the Supreme Soviet.
12
The CCS is certainly a better solution than models one and two, and
although falling short of model three, it seems to be a promising step
toward a genuine Western European-type constitutional court.
This Article will trace in detail the legislative process that led to the
establishment of a Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the
USSR and may provide insight into several aspects of an emerging polit-
ical and legal culture in the Soviet Union. On the political side, one may
observe the development of democratic procedures and substantive
input in legislative and appointive decisions by an unexpectedly asser-
tive legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies. In the unfolding
dialogue between the Congress and its presiding officer, Mikhail S.
Gorbachev has demonstrated his mastery of the art of the forward-mov-
ing compromise.' 3 On the legal side, one may note the considerable
momentum in the Soviet Union's approach toward a Western style rule
of law as evidenced by the dynamic generation and evolution of reform-
ative ideas on constitutional supervision between December 1, 1988 and
December 23, 1989.
I. Legislative History of the Committee on Constitutional Supervision
A. Introduction: Constitutional Changes of Soviet Institutions in
1988
One of the five resolutions passed by the All-Union Conference of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") in June 1988 bears the
title "On Legal Reform."' 4 It calls for comprehensive reform of the
Soviet legal system, including measures "to secure the supremacy of the
10. Kuss, supra note 4, at 358-360. Letowski, Die Einfiihrung einer Verfassungsgericht-
sbarkeit in der Volksrepublik Polen, RECHT IN OST UND WEST No. 1, 24, 25 (1987).
11. Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR no. 49, item 727 (1988). For the English translation
of the amendments, see KONST. SSSR, reprinted in 15 REv. SOCIALIST L. No. 1 at 75-
115.
12. For the text of the four respective enactments, see Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26,
1989, at 1 and 3.
13. Cf Tretiakov, Gorbachev's Enigma: A Political Profile Against the Background of Per-
estroika, Moscow News No. 48, Nov. 26, 1989, at 9.
14. The other four resolutions are entitled: "On Democratizing Soviet Society
and Reforming the Political System," "On Combating Bureaucracy," "On Relations
Between Soviet Nationalities," and "On Glasnost." All five were printed in Pravda
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statute1 5 ... in all spheres of society's life" (point 1), "to democratize
the legislative process" (point 2), to conduct "a cardinal review, codifi-
cation and systematization of legislation" (point 3), to enhance "the role
of courts of law" (point 4), "to increase the responsibility of the Procu-
rator's Office" (point 6), and to increase "the role of the Bar" (point 8).
In a rather inconspicuous place, at the end of point 3, the Resolution
suggests an institutional innovation of potentially far-reaching effect and
a major step on the road toward a future "(Socialist) State Under the
Rule of Law" (sotsialisticheskoe pravovoe gosudarstvo): 16 "To make law and
government decisions conform strictly to the requirements of the Con-
stitution of the USSR, it would be useful to set up a Committee for Con-
stitutional Supervision .... ",17
In early compliance with this Party mandate, the Supreme Soviet
enacted sweeping changes in the "Brezhnev" Constitution of 1977. The
"USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution
(Fundamental Law)"'1 8 altered or newly introduced no fewer than 55 of
a total of 174 articles. 19 Among the additions, a new article 125 estab-
lished a Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR (Komitet
konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR).
The revised Constitution also provided for a new electoral system
and for a new two-tiered structure of the federal parliament. Under arti-
cle 108 of the Constitution, a 2,250 member Congress of People's Depu-
ties of the USSR (S"ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR) was established as the
"supreme organ of state power of the USSR."'20 The Congress was
meant to meet briefly once a year 2 1 to decide the most important polit-
ical questions, such as changing the Constitution, 2 2 approving long-
term state plans, 23 and electing the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
24
Among the 13 points on the list of issues assigned to the exclusive juris-
diction of the Congress we find point 11: "Election of the Committee of
and Izvestiia on July 5, 1988. I am citing from the English translation provided by
Moscow News, Supplement to issue No. 29, July 17, 1988, at 6.
15. Verkhovenstvo zakona, Izvestiia No. 187, July 5, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
16. See Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 205, 205-207 (1990). For recent Soviet discussions of this topic see B. N.
Topornin ed., supra note 2, and PUL's REFORM [THE PULSE OF THE REFORMS] (Iu. M.
Baturin ed. 1989).
17. Moscow News, Supplement to Issue No. 29, July 17, 1988, at 6, col. 2.
18. Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR no. 49, item 727 (1988).
19. For a description of these changes see Lazarev & Sliva, Konstitutsionnaia reforma
- pervyi etap, [Constitutional Reform-Stage One], Sov. Gos. & PRAvo No. 3, at 3-14
(1989); Brunner & Schmidt, Die sowjetische Verfassungsreform vom Dezember 1988 [The
Soviet Constitutional Reform of December 1988], 35 OSTEUROPA RECHT 77 (1989).
20. KONST. SSSR, art. 108, reprinted in 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. No. 1 at 85.
21. Id. art. I10, sec. 4 at 87. A constitutional amendment of Dec. 20, 1989
changed the text to read "at least once a year." Izvestiia No. 363, Dec. 28, 1989, at 1,
col. 3.
22. KONST. SSSR, art. 110, sec. 4, reprinted in 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. No. 1 at 87.
23. Id. art. 108(1) at 85.
24. Id. art. 108(5) at 87.
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Constitutional Supervision of the USSR. ' '25
A Supreme Soviet, according to the amendment, shall conduct reg-
ular legislative and appointive activity as "the standing legislative,
administrative and monitoring organ of USSR state power." 26 The
Supreme Soviet consists of 542 deputies elected by the Congress from
among its members to function as a "working legislature," holding two
sessions of approximately four months each per year.
B. Congressional Debates and Republic Concerns in 1989
The First Congress of People's Deputies was elected under the revised
Constitution on March 26, 1989 and began its first session on May 25.
Its lively and critical debates and its rigorous assertion of constitutional
prerogatives are still vividly remembered. Point 8 on the Congress
Agenda was the election of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision
of the USSR.2 7 The question came up in the afternoon session of June
8.28
1. Composition of the Committee
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail S. Gorbachev, functioning as
presiding officer, pointed out that under the Constitution, the Commit-
tee was to be elected by the Congress for a term of ten years from
among "specialists in the field of politics and law" and to consist of a
chairman, a deputy chairman, and twenty-one members, including one
representative from each of the fifteen union republics. 29 He submitted
the proposal to elect Vladimir N. Kudriavtsev (Vice-President of the
USSR Academy of Sciences) Chairman of the Committee of Constitu-
tional Supervision and to elect Boris M. Lazarev (Head of a Sector of the
Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences) Deputy Chair-
man of the Committee.
3 0
In the ensuing debate one deputy critically remarked that he could
not detect a single non-Party person among the proposed membership
of the Committee.3 1 Another deputy saw in Kudriavtsev's professional
activities "desires to please the authorities without fail," and he bluntly
suggested: "We had our fill of compromisers a long time ago." a3 2 This
theme was elaborated by the well-known poet E. A. Evtushenko; he
attacked the proposed chairman for never having spoken up in defense
of dissidents and for having implicitly supported the odious article 11.1
25. Id art. 108(11) at 87.
26. Id- art. 111, sec. 1 at 89.
27. Izvestiia No. 146, May 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
28. Stenographic report is located in Izvestiia No. 161,June 10, 1989, at 6, col. 7.
29. 41 CuRR T DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 31, Aug. 30, 1989, at 22.
30. Id.
31. The deputy was N. N. Vorontsov, biologist, Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, Moscow. Id.
32. The deputy was V. I. Kolotov, newspaper editor, Vyborg, RSFSR. Id.
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of the April 8 Edict (ukaz) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.33
Kudriavtsev was ably defended by A. M. Iakovlev,3 4 who vouched
for the nominee's integrity35 and stressed his quietly effective work to
change the edict in talks with the Politburo. 36 When Kudriavtsev
replied to his critics, he emphasized his work for the humanization of
Soviet criminal law and engaged in specific self-criticism: "Seeing short-
comings in Art. 11.1, I didn't say anything about it in my commentary.
Perhaps it was wrong on my part to keep silent about it, but on that very
day I spoke with several leaders about it. .... ,37
Another major complaint, raised by Deputy A. M. Obolenskii,
3 8
concerned the late submission of the list of candidates for membership
in the Committee of Constitutional Supervision. The deputies had
received the list on the very day of voting, and they deplored the scarcity
of accompanying biographical information. 39 Obolenskii and ten of the
subsequent nineteen speakers urged a postponement of the election to
the fall session of the Congress.
40
2. Republic Opposition to the CCS
The most serious objections to the immediate election of the Commit-
tee, however, came from the representatives of one of the Baltic repub-
lics. Deputy R. V. Gudaitis, 4 1 speaking on behalf of the majority of the
33. The speaker was the Deputy from Kharkov, Ukraine. Id. at 23. For the Edict
(ukaz), see Izvestiia No. 101, Apr. 10, 1989, at 2, col. 1, cols. 2-3 and 41 CURRENT DIG.
Soy. PRESS No. 15, May 10, 1989, at 11. Article 11.1 reads "Public insults against or
the discrediting of the supreme bodies of state power and administration of the
USSR or other state agencies formed or elected by the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet, or officials appointed, elected or confirmed
by the USSR Congress of People's deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as
public organizations and their all-Union agencies created in accordance with the pro-
cedure established by law and operating in accordance with the USSR Constitution-
are punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years or by a fine
of up to 2,000 rubles." Id. It was narrowly interpreted by a subsequent Guiding
Explanation of the Supreme Court of the USSR, see 41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS No.
21, June 21, 1989, at 30-31, and ultimately repealed by the Congress of People's
Deputies onJune 8, 1989, see 41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 33, Sept. 13, 1989, at
27. For critical comments of legal scholars (including Kudriavtsev's), see Foreign
Broadcast Information System, Soviet Series issue 89-074 (Apr. 19, 1989) and For-
eign Broadcast Information System, Soviet Series issue 89-076 (Apr. 21, 1989).
34. Professor of Law, Head of a Sector in the Institute of State and Law of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Kudriavtsev had been Director of this Institute
for 15 years until 1989.
35. "Of course, all of us are children of our times ... We did not always muster
the courage to speak the truth in time. We did not always rise to the level of, say,
Academician Sakharov, who alone, perhaps, spoke the truth when we remained
silent. All this is true. And perhaps we are all guilty of this. But to say that he said
something against his conscience or against truth and honor-that never hap-
pened .. " 41 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 31, Aug. 30, 1989, at 22.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Design engineer, Leningrad. Id. at 23.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Writer, Vilnius, Lithuania. Id. at 22.
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Lithuanian delegation, announced that he and his colleagues would
refuse to participate in such an election for a variety of reasons, the
three most important of which appear to have been:
first - the Congress has identified a constitutional crisis, in the
form of internal contradictions in the Basic Law dating from the time of
stagnation, and the need to create a new USSR Constitution, not [to]
exercise supervision over compliance with an outdated document;
second - there is still no actual law on constitutional review in the
USSR;
third - the powers of the USSR Constitutional Review Committee,
as stipulated in the Constitution with the relevant additions, permit this
body to infringe on the sovereign rights of the Union republics .... 42
A Latvian deputy, A. A. Plotnieks, subsequently argued that the
Congress should restrict the powers of the Committee by changing arti-
cle 125 of the Constitution.43 In his view, the CCS should not be able to
suspend provisions of Republic constitutions found to be at variance
with the Union Constitution.
44
A large majority of the 2,250 deputies voted to establish the CCS.
Only 433 deputies voted against, 61 abstained, and about 50 Lithuanian
deputies walked out in protest of the CCS issue.45 This stunning polit-
ical eclat moved deputy F. M. Burlatsky to suggest "that the discussion
of this question be postponed until tomorrow, and that .. .Mikhail
Sergeevich Gorbachev personally be asked to enter into talks with repre-
sentatives of the Lithuanian delegation .... 4 6 Gorbachev and the Con-
gress immediately adopted Burlatsky's proposal without a vote. The
Congress, thereby, apparently intended to nullify the election of the
CCS.
4 7
During the next day's Congressional session, Gorbachev reported
on his discussions with the deputies from Lithuania and Estonia and
asked the Congress to form a Commission to Prepare a Draft Law of the
USSR on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR. 4 8 The Congress
established the twenty-three member Commission with ten votes against
the proposal and twenty-five abstentions.
49
On November 10, 1989 the Commission, chaired by Deputy D. A.
Kerimov,50 submitted the Draft Law and a proposal to amend article
42. Id.
43. The deputy was a Professor of Law, Riga. Id at 23.
44. Id
45. Id at 29. For a detailed account see Izvestiia No. 161,June 10, 1989, at 9, col.
1.
46. The deputy was a commentator for Literaturmaia Gazeta, Moscow. 41 CURRENT
DIG. SOy. PRESs No. 31, Aug. 30, 1989, at 29.
47. Id As the subsequent proceeding in the Congress demonstrates, the vote was
simply ignored.
48. Ved. S'ezda Nar. Dep. & Verkh. Sov. SSSR no. 1, item 24 (1989); Izvestiia No.
162, June 11, 1989, at 1, col. 7.
49. 41 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 33, Sept. 13, 1989, at 26.
50. Professor of Law at the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
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125 of the Constitution to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.51 On
November 13, the Supreme Soviet endorsed the agenda for the Second
Session of the Congress of People's Deputies that was to begin on
December 12.52 The agenda included as item 6 "The Draft Law on
Constitutional Supervision in the USSR," and as item 7 "Election of the
Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR."153 Both items
were apparently adopted without opposition.54
When the Congress discussed its own agenda on December 12,
however, a number of deputies demanded to drop items 6 and 7.55 Pro-
fessor A. A. Plotnieks, speaking on behalf of ninety-two Estonian, Lithu-
anian, and Latvian deputies, spelled out three major reasons for
postponing the establishment of a CCS until a "perestroika"of the
Union Constitution had been accomplished. 56 First, to let the Commit-
tee enforce an obsolete "Brezhnev" Constitution over technically
unconstitutional perestroika legislation would put a "legal muzzle" on
perestroika. Second, the Nationalities Policy platform of the CPSU
envisages the redistribution of jurisdiction between the union and the
republics. This task has not yet been accomplished. Article 74 of the
existing Constitution 57 gives union law absolute priority over republic
law, while the new Nationalities Policy platform recognizes areas in
which republic legislation will enjoy priority. Third, article 76 of the
Constitution 58 establishes union republics as sovereign states. This sov-
ereignty is violated if republic laws may be declared ineffective at any
moment.
The next speaker fully endorsed Plotnieks's argument, adding that
the Draft Law should have been submitted to the Supreme Soviet,
because the latter's Chamber of Nationalities would have provided a
proper forum for the airing of views and for the protection of republics'
interests; to decide this question in the Congress would be undemo-
cratic and would violate the equality of the republics. 59
In the ensuing debate, a deputy from Moldavia supported the posi-
tion of the Baltic republics,6 0 while a Russian deputy introduced a new
51. Izvestiia No. 316, Nov. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
52. Izvestiia No. 319, Nov. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
53. Id.
54. See Priniaty vazhnye resheniia "[Important Decisions Adopted], id. at 2, col. 5 (corre-
spondents' report).
55. For excerpts from this debate in English, see 41 CURRENr DIG. SOy. PRESS
No. 50, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6-8.
56. Izvestiia No. 347, Dec. 13, 1989, at 5, co1 . 8.
57. "The laws of the USSR shall have the same force in all Union Republics. In
the event of a discrepancy between a Union republic law and an All-Union law, the
law of the USSR shall prevail." KONST. SSSR [CONSTtrroN OF THE USSR]. (1977),
art. 74.
58. "A Union Republic is a sovereign Soviet Socialist state that has united with
other Soviet Republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .. " Id. art. 76.
59. The speaker was E. V. Bichkauskas, an investigator from Vilnius, Lithuania.
Izvestiia No. 348, Dec. 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
60. L. I. Iorga, id. at 5, col. 2.
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reason for excluding item 6 from the agenda: Why should a simple,
specific law occupy the attention and valuable time of the Congress
rather than being discussed by the Supreme Soviet?
6 1
Despite the opposition from the Baltic and Moldavian deputies, the
majority of deputies clearly favored inclusion of item 6 in the agenda.
Russian deputies, including some living in Baltic republics, 62 pointed to
recent discriminatory legislation in the Baltic republics that clearly vio-
lated the rights of non-Baltic citizens under the USSR Constitution, and
they emphasized the immediate need for a state organ that would pro-
vide a civilized procedure of conflict resolution between the union and
the republics.
63
The Congress eventually decided to leave consideration on the
Draft Law creating the CCS on the agenda by a large majority. 64 Once
this had been decided, it appeared logical to the Congress to retain item
7 (election of the CCS) as well.
6 5
3. The Kerimov Commission Report and the Debates in the Second Session of
the Congress, December 21-22, 1989
During the morning session of the Congress on December 21, Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail S. Gorbachev called on Deputy D. A. Ker-
imov to report on the Draft Law on Constitutional Supervision in the
USSR.
6 6
To begin, Professor Kerimov emphasized the functions of the Con-
stitution as the legal basis of all legislation. A mechanism of constitu-
tional supervision would ensure the conformity of all other normative
acts with the Constitution. He pointed out that by the 1950s all civilized
countries of the world had established some kind of constitutional
supervision, or monitoring, or constitutional court. 67 Kerimov deplored
the absence of such an organ in the history of Soviet government. Often
deftly circumvented, simply ignored, or flagrantly violated, constitu-
tional principles and norms also generally were overwhelmed by the
61. A. V. Levashev, id. at 4, col. 3. Under the Constitution, both the Congress
(art. 108) and the Supreme Soviet (art. 113) may adopt laws, but laws of the Supreme
Soviet must not contradict laws of the Congress, and they may be annulled by the
latter. Only the Congress may change the Constitution.
62. V. I. Iarovoi, id. at 5, col. 5; E. V. Kogan, id. col. 6.
63. Iu. V. Golik, id. at 4, col. 5. For further discussion of republic opposition to
the CCS, see Brovkin, The Politics of Constitutional Reform: The New Power Structure and
the Role of the Party, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323, 335-36 (1990).
64. 1,595 deputies voted for the proposal, 437 voted against, and 42 abstained.
Id. at 5, col. 8.
65. Id.
66. Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 10, col. 6. Kerimov chaired the 23 mem-
ber commission set up in the First Session of the Congress for the purpose of draft-
ing this Law. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. Its report is printed in
Izvestiia, supra, at 2, cols. 1-8.
67. For a comparative discussion see M. CAPPELLETrI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 150 (1989) and E. MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND
JUDICIAL LAw-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
(1986).
Cornell International Law Journal
heavy load of government directives and countless orders and instruc-
tions of ministries and agencies. The "Fundamental Law" deteriorated
into a fiction, a seemingly democratic facade designed to hide the law-
lessness and arbitrariness of the periods of the cult of personality,
6 8 of
voluntarism, 69 and of stagnation.
70
And, Kerimov continued, violations of the Constitution occur even
today. The establishment of the Committee of Constitutional Supervi-
sion is urgent and cannot wait until a full-scale renewal of the existing
Constitution has been accomplished. Kerimov explicitly refuted the
arguments raised by those deputies who insisted that the old
"Brezhnev" Constitution does not live up to the new demands and tasks
of perestroika and should thus not be enforced. Although in part obso-
lete, the Constitution of 1977 also contains democratic norms that must
be observed, such as those referring to the sovereignty of republics.
7 1
An organ of constitutional supervision could identify constitutional pro-
visions that impede perestroika and recommend to the Congress that
such provisions be changed or repealed. The new legislation on owner-
ship, land, socialist enterprises, the tax system, economic and social
administration in the republics, local self-government, and local econ-
omy will contain basic provisions that will be incorporated in the Consti-
tution gradually. A mechanism is required to ensure the enforceability
of these laws. Constitutional supervision must serve as a link in this
mechanism. If one wants to be serious about implementing a state
under the rule of law (pravovoe gosudarstvo), one must recognize that the
function of this state is not just to produce laws, but also to supervise the
observance and application of these laws by all participants in legal
relations.
Kerimov then informed the deputies of the high quality of his Com-
mission's work, of its extensive consultation with experts of constitu-
tional law, its studies of the theory and practice of constitutional
supervision of socialist and capitalist countries, and its discussions with
foreign specialists. He also remarked that the Commission, in the
course of its work on the Draft Law, was going to propose a developed
and expanded article 125 of the Constitution to Congress. He then pro-
vided brief comments on the most important specific features of the leg-
islative drafts submitted to the deputies.
7 2
68. Khrushchev's characterization of Stalin's political style.
69. Brezhnev's label for Khrushchev's politics.
70. Gorbachev's view of Brezhnev's rule.
71. "A Union Republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state that has united with
other Soviet Republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Outside the
spheres listed in art. 73 of the Constitution of the USSR, a Union Republic exercises
independent authority on its territory. A Union Republic shall have its own Constitu-
tion conforming to the Constitution of the USSR with the specific features of the
Republic being taken into account." KONST. SSSR (1977), art. 76.
72. See the discussion of the respective legislative enactments infra at notes 82-85
and accompanying text.
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When Kerimov had ended his report, presiding officer Gorbachev
took the unusual step of giving a "co-report" before opening the
debate. 73 He described the existing legal situation regarding republic
law violating the Union Constitution. Under article 74 of the Constitu-
tion of the USSR, federal law prevails over republic law, and under arti-
cle 119, section 5, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet already
monitors the observance of the Constitution and ensures the conformity
of constitutions and laws of republics with the Constitution and laws of
the USSR. The creation of a Committee of Constitutional Supervision
will only improve this situation. The CCS is needed to make progress
toward a state under the rule of law; it will consist of the most outstand-
ing experts, and it provides a mechanism of cooperation with all repub-
lics. Although the opposition of the Baltic republics had recently been
joined by the Interregional Group of Deputies, Gorbachev urged the
Congress not to become involved in "a political game the aims of which
are incomprehensible."-
74
After Gorbachev's "co-report," Deputy I. N. Griazin presented a
minority view75 on behalf of four Commission members.76 This "dis-
senting opinion" (osoboe mnenie) raised serious objections to individual
provisions of the drafts (article 125 of the Constitution, and articles 10,
11, and 22 of the Law), to the extent the provisions would subject
republic constitutions and laws to CCS supervision. The minority
report argued that the republics as sovereign states are not subordinate
to any federal organs, that they could only submit voluntarily to self-
imposed duties, and that all provisions limiting the republics' right to
sovereign legislation should be removed from the drafts.
In three meetings on December 21 and 22, the Congress heard the
views of twenty-five deputies, 77 twenty of whom supported the immedi-
ate establishment of the CCS. Of the four opponents other than Griazin
(Estonia), Khadyrke (Moldavia) emphasized the need for a voluntary
agreement among the republics concerning the nature of the federation
and the corresponding necessity to submit the Draft Law on the CCS to
the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet. 78 Skudra (Latvia)
argued along similar lines, stressing that article 6 of the Law on Consti-
tutional Supervision should accord the republics the right to approve
their candidates for membership in the CCS, and that article 10 of the
73. Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 10, col. 6.
74. Id. at col. 7.
75. This is a right under art. 41 of the "Rules of Procedure" (Reglament) of the
Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, adopted on
Dec. 20, 1989. Izvestiia No. 363, Dec. 28, 1989, at 2, col. 6. For further discussion of
legislative procedures, see Belousovitch, The New Soviet Parliament: Process, Procedures,
and Legislative Priority, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 275, 280-81 (1990).
76. Buachidze (Gruzia), Griazin (Estonia), Skudra (Latvia), and Smailis (Lithua-
nia). Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 10, col. 8.
77. See the stenographic report in Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 10-11 and
in Izvestiia No. 357, Dec. 23, at 5-7 and 9-10.
78. Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 11, col. 6.
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Law, which enumerates legal acts subject to the supervision of the CCS,
should exclude all reference to republic legal acts. 79 Abuladze (Gruzia),
although generally in favor of constitutional supervision, pleaded
against moving too fast.80 Moteka (Lithuania) finally read a declaration
of the Parliamentary Group of Baltic Republics claiming that the Law on
Constitutional Supervision would constitute a counterproductive viola-
tion of republic rights. He demanded that the Congress should post-
pone the Draft and seek consensus. Otherwise, he threatened, the Baltic
deputies would not participate in the vote.81
4. Modifications of the Legislative Drafts After the First Reading in the
Congress
During the noon recess on December 22, the Kerimov Commission
examined the numerous proposals for modification and adopted a
number of fundamental changes in the legislative drafts before the Con-
gress. Kerimov reported and explained these changes in the afternoon
meeting and also gave detailed attention to those suggestions that were
not adopted by the Commission.8 2 There were three especially impor-
tant changes.
First, the Decree (postanovlenie) On Putting into Effect the Law of the
USSR "On Constitutional Supervision in the USSR" is to provide that
the Law goes into effect on January 1, 1990, with the exception of the
provisions referring to republic constitutions and laws. These provi-
sions should become effective simultaneously with future changes in the
part of the Union Constitution dealing with the national-state structure
of the USSR.
Second, article 21 of the Draft Law on Constitutional Supervision is
to provide that legal acts violating basic human rights or freedoms pro-
tected by the Constitution of the USSR, or by international agreements
to which the USSR is a party, are to lose their force immediately with the
adoption of the respective finding by the CCS. This will require a corre-
sponding addition to article 125 of the Constitution and a modification
of the Introductory Decree. The temporary suspension of constitutional
supervision of republic constitutions and laws, therefore, does not apply
to violations of human rights.
Finally, article 25 of the Law and article 125 of the Constitution
should provide for twenty-five (instead of twenty-one) members of the
CCS, including four from the autonomous formations.8"
The Committee also adopted five other changes of lesser impor-
79. Izvestiia No. 357, Dec. 23, 1989, at 10, col. 5.
80. Id. at col. 6.
81. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, cols. 1-3.
82. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 6 and at 3, col. 2.
83. Below the level of "sovereign" union republics (and included in their territo-
ries) the Soviet Constitution recognizes three types of "autonomous" formations:
autonomous republics (art. 82), autonomous regions (art. 86), and autonomous areas
(art. 88). At present there are 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous regions, and
10 autonomous areas in the USSR.
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tance affecting articles 1, 3, 12, 16, and the former article 2884 of the
Draft Law. The Committee rejected a great number of proposed
changes, particularly changes to articles 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, and
24. Most of these will be referred to in the following examination of the
Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR.85
II. The CCS: Legal Foundations
A. The Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR
The Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR86 adopted by the
Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on December 23, 198987 is
comprised of thirty-one articles grouped into five parts: General Provi-
sions, Membership and Process of Election of the CCS, Jurisdiction and
Procedure of the CCS, Status of Persons Elected to the CCS, and Other
Questions of the Organization of the CCS.
1. General Provisions
Article 1 defines the aims of constitutional supervision in the USSR. It is
to ensure "the conformity of acts of state organs and social organiza-
tions with the Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of union
republics and autonomous republics" and to protect "constitutional
human rights and freedoms, rights of the peoples of the USSR, and the
democratic principles of Soviet society."8 8
The inclusion of the protection of human rights in this catalog of
purposes of constitutional supervision was suggested by Deputies
Sobchak and Umarkhodzhaev8 9 and adopted without opposition.
Article 2 establishes several systems of constitutional supervision to
correspond with the governmental organization of the Soviet Union.
Thus, the article introduces the CCS of the USSR and provides for
organs of constitutional supervision to be created in the union republics
and autonomous republics. The Commission report on the Draft Law
made clear that the republics may establish their own organs to super-
vise the conformity of republic law with republic constitutions. These
organs would act in complete independence from the CCS of the USSR.
Article 3 lays down the fundamental principles guiding the activity
of all organs of constitutional supervision: socialist legality, collegiality,
and glasnost. The organs are independent and subject only to the Con-
84. Old article 28 is article 27 of the revised Draft.
85. See infra notes 86-130 and accompanying text.
86. Zahon SSSR "0 konstitutsionnom nadore v SSSR"[Law of the USSR "On Constitu-
tional Supervision in the USSR", Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1, cols. 7-8 and at
3, cols. 1-6.
87. 1,639 deputies voted for the Law, 137 against, and 103 abstained. Izvestiia
No. 359, Dec. 25, 1989, at 2, col. 3.
88. The wording was proposed by Deputy Kugul'tinov. See Kerimov's second
report, Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 7.
89. Id. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
limits of this protection.
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stitution, and any interference in their work is inadmissible and
punishable.
Article 4 assigns the task of legislation on constitutional supervision
to the Union and to union and autonomous republics.
2. Membership and Election Process
Article 5 provides that members of the CCS be elected from among
"specialists in the area of politics and law." 90 There shall be a chairman,
a deputy chairman, and twenty-five members, including one from each
republic. In a last minute political compromise, the Congress increased
the membership from twenty-one to twenty-five in order to accommo-
date four additional members from autonomous formations of the
USSR;9 1 however, the Law does not clearly reflect this compromise.
This specification appears only in section 3 of the Decree (postanovlenie)
"On the Election of the CCS of the USSR ' 92 which instructs the
Supreme Soviet to elect the first members of the Committee at its next
regular session.93 Thus, legally, the four seats for experts from autono-
mous formations have been secured only for the first slate of members.
Under article 6 of the Law, the Chairman, 'Deputy Chairman and
members of the CCS are to be elected by the Congress of People's Dep-
uties for periods of ten years each. The Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet shall propose nominees to the Congress. 94 For election, nomi-
nees must receive a majority vote from the Congress. 95 In order to
guarantee continuity in the work of the CCS, the Law provides for stag-
gered elections. One half of its membership is to be renewed every five
years.
Article 6, however, has constitutional infirmities and thus is a bla-
tant example of poor legislative draftsmanship. Article 125 of the Con-
90. The establishment of minimum and maximum age requirements, as sug-
gested by Deputy Kryzhkov, was rejected by the Commission as arbitrary and without
scientific foundation. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 8.
91. Some deputies had proposed to increase the membership to 40 or more, in
order to include members from all (i.e. 20) autonomous republics. This request was
refused by the Commission. Id. The original demand to increase the number to 30
in order to accommodate representatives of autonomous formations was voiced by
Deputy Khugaeva (Yugo-Osetian Autonomous Region, Gruzian Republic) in the
Congress meeting. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, at 2, col. 1.
92. Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 7. Moreover, Congress apparently
forgot to include the revised number of 25 members in art. 5. As published in
"Izvestiia," however, the Law does contain a membership number of 25. Id.
93. In its meeting on Dec. 23 the Congress of People's Deputies was running out
of time and thus called on the Supreme Soviet to perform this function. See infra
notes 143-162 and accompanying text.
94. Deputies repeatedly demanded the right of republics to propose "their" can-
didates, and some proposed a contested election of members in the Congress, but
the Commission upheld Gorbachev's constitutional prerogative under art. 121(3) to
present "his" candidates for confirmation (or rejection), emphasizing that he would
naturally consult with the republics. See Kerimov's second report, Izvestiia No. 358,
Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 8.
95. At least 1,126 out of the total number of 2,250.
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stitution, as enacted on Dec. 1, 1988, provided for an office term of ten
years for the CCS. It said nothing about renewal of one half of the
membership every five years. The Kerimov Commission obviously con-
sidered it useful to introduce this idea into the Law and at the same time
decided to elect the individual members for ten-year terms. It seems
that the election of individuals would have, after a while, produced the
desired effect of staggered elections in a perfectly natural way (death,
incapacitation, and other cases of premature resignation). By putting
the five year renewal clause in article 6 of the Law, the Commission
resorted to a less than elegant and apparently unconstitutional9 6 solu-
tion. One half of the first membership would be elected for only five
years.9 7 Aside from the obvious impossibility of renewing one half of a
total membership of twenty-seven (chairman, deputy, and twenty-five
members), it is unseemly and awkward to first have the Supreme Soviet
elect twenty-five members of the CCS for ten year terms, and then have
them draw lots from the Chairman by which thirteen of them (clearly not
including chairman and deputy chairman this time) would have their
terms reduced to merely five years. 98
Furthermore, Commission Chairman Kerimov indicated that he
envisaged the re-election of some of those thirteen members, who were
initially permitted to serve only five years, to subsequent ten-year
terms. 99 This would certainly upset the renewal principle of article 6.
The unresolved contradiction between the ten-year term and the
renewal clause in article 6 was noticed by Deputy Umarkhodzhaev, 10 0
but his observation went unheeded.
In the plenary debate, Deputy Ibragimov' 0 1 suggested to include
the oath to be taken by the members of the CCS in the text of the law.
Article 7 sets forth the formulation: "I solemnly swear to fulfil conscien-
tiously the duties imposed on me as a member of the CCS of the USSR,
and in doing so, to obey all provisions of the Constitution of the USSR
and nothing but these." The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet shall
administer this oath.
96. The text of art. 125 of the Constitution of the USSR as amended Dec. 23,
1989 makes no exception to the rule that the period of office of persons elected to
the CCS is ten years. In addition, it makes no reference to a principle of renewal. See
infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
97. Section 2 of the Decree (postanovenie) of the Congress of People's Deputies
"On Putting into Effect the Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR" of Dec.
23, 1989 is printed in Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 5. See the descrip-
tion of section 2 of the Introductory Decree infta at p. 313.
98. Izvestiia, No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
99. See Kerimov's reply to Deputy Ibragimov's suggestion to expressly prohibit
reelection of members in Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 8. Members of
the Yugoslav and the Polish Constitutional Court serve for eight years, and members
of the German Constitutional Court serve for 12 years. They may not serve a second
term.
100. Izvestiia No. 357, Dec. 23, 1989, at 7, col. 2.
101. Id. at 10, col. 1.
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Article 8 contemplates four situations of premature termination of
membership to the CCS. Such termination may occur at a member's
own request, in case of incapacity for reasons of health, where there has
been a violation of the oath of office, or in light of a criminal convic-
tion. 10 2 The Congress may, upon the proposal of the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, decide to relieve a member of his duties. When the
Congress is not in session, the Supreme Soviet may suspend members
who have violated their oath or whose criminal conviction has entered
into legal force.
Since the Constitution contains no provision for the premature dis-
missal of the members of the CCS, their removal from office against
their will before completion of their constitutional term of ten years
appears to be barely constitutional. The same criticism applies to article
9 which provides for a supplementary election to fill the remainder of
the term of a member who has prematurely left office. 10 3 The Constitu-
tion recognizes only ten-year terms for the members. Article 9 of the
Law seems to be another remnant of the previous rule providing for a
ten-year term of the Committee.10 4 The article excludes a supplemen-
tary election if the remaining period is shorter than one year. Surpris-
ingly, articles 8 and 9 do not mention the premature death of a member.
3. Jurisdiction and Procedure
Article 10 of the Law describes the subject matter jurisdiction of the
CCS. The Committee will check the following legislative acts for con-
formity with the Constitution of the USSR: a) Drafts of laws (zakony) of
the USSR and of other acts submitted for consideration by the Congress
of People's Deputies; b) Laws of the USSR and other acts already
adopted by the Congress; and c) Constitutions of union republics.
The CCS will monitor the conformity of certain legislative acts to
the Constitution of the USSR and laws of the USSR adopted by the Con-
gress: a) Laws of the USSR and other acts adopted by the Supreme
Soviet; b) Decrees (postanovieniia) of the Soviet of the Union and of the
Soviet of Nationalities; and c) Draft acts submitted for consideration by
these organs.
Finally, article 10 subjects the following types of laws to scrutiny for
conformity with the Constitution of the USSR and laws of the USSR
adopted by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet: a) Edicts (ukazy) and
decrees (postanovieniia) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; b) Regu-
lations (rasporiazheniia) of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; c) Laws
of union republics; d) Decrees (postanovleniia) and regulations
102. The provisions are similar to those of the respective Polish statute of 1985.
See Ludwikowski, supra note 1, at 101.
103. The proposal by Komsomol deputies not to fill these vacancies was rejected
by the Commission. See Kerimov's second report, Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at
2, col. 8. Kerimov argued that the Constitution has only regular elections in mind,
whereas art. 9 of the Law applies to special elections. Id.
104. Cf supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussion of art. 6).
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(rasporiazheniia) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; e) International
treaties and other obligations of the USSR and union republics submit-
ted for ratification or confirmation; f) Guiding explanations
(rukovodiashchie raz"iasneniia) of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the
USSR;10 5 g) Acts of the Procurator General of the USSR and the Chief
State Arbitrator of the USSR that have normative character; and h) Nor-
mative legal acts of other state organs and social organizations that lie
outside the constitutional scope of Procuracy supervision.10 6 The
supervisory function of the CCS does not extend to individual judg-
ments and other court decisions, decisions by organs of investigation,
the Procuracy, and State Arbitration.
Article 11 empowers the CCS to decide jurisdictional disputes aris-
ing from the federal structure of the USSR: a) between the USSR and
republics, b) between union republics, and c) between union republics
and national-state or national-territorial formations.
The CCS shall decide disputes arising over the constitutionality of
acts adopted by organs of state power and administration upon the initi-
ative of any party to the dispute.
Article 12 lists the organs entitled to submit questions to the CCS.
The Congress may submit questions concerning the drafts of laws and
other acts under consideration by the Congress. With respect to
existing laws of the USSR and other acts adopted by the Congress, one-
fifth of the people's deputies, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet,' 0 7
or supreme organs of state power of republics may raise an issue with
105. Deputy A. M. Iakovlev (Professor of Law, Academy of Sciences, and a mem-
ber of the Kerimov Commission) insisted on the independence of courts and wanted
to exclude the guiding explanations from supervision by the CCS. Deputy Semenko
(Chairman of a regional court and also a commission member) supported the origi-
nal draft. Kerimov argued against Iakovlev and prevailed, pointing out that there
would be no interference with individual court decisions, but only an examination of
general decrees (i.e. guiding explanations) of the Supreme Court that had in the past
frequently exceeded and changed the law. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3, col.
1. See also Iakovlev's broader request to also exclude from supervision normative
acts of the Procuracy and the Chief Arbitrator in Izvestiia No. 357, Dec. 23, 1989, at
7, col. 1.
106. Procurator General (and Deputy) Sukharev wanted to exclude social organi-
zations from supervision by the CCS, pointing out that they were subject to
Procuracy supervision under art. 164 of the Constitution. Kerimov replied that there
were important acts of these organizations beyond the scope of Procuracy supervi-
sion, e.g. Joint Ordinances of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the All-Union
Council of Labor Unions or with the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Sukharev's
request was declined. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
Procuracy supervision of state organs extends from the normative acts of individ-
ual ministries downwards. It does not encompass acts of councils of ministers or of
legislative bodies. KONST. SSSR (1977), art. 164.
107. An unidentified deputy (whom Kerimov mistakenly assumed to be speaking
on behalf of the Interregional Group of Deputies, but this was later denied by Deputy
Fomenko, see Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3) suggested not to grant
this right to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, but Kerimov insisted that the
Chairman was one of the guarantors of the Constitution. Id. at 3, col. 1. Deputy
Obolenskii wanted every deputy to have the right to exercise this initiative, but Ker-
imov's second report explained that individual deputies should take their requests to
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the CCS. The Congress, the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, or supreme organs of state power of union republics
may challenge constitutions and laws of union republics. The Congress,
one-fifth of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, or supreme organs of state power of republics may
contest laws of the USSR and other acts adopted by the Supreme Soviet,
decrees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, draft
acts of these organs, decrees and regulations of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR, and international treaties and other obligations of the
USSR and the republics. Finally, the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, its
chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, permanent commissions of the chambers and commit-
tees of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, supreme organs of
state power of union republics, the Committee of People's Control, the
Supreme Court of the USSR, the Procurator General, the Chief State
Arbitrator, all-Union organs of social organizations, and the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR may raise issues pertaining to normative legal acts
of other state organs and social organizations.
Moreover, the CCS may, on its own initiative, examine for conform-
ity with the Constitution and laws of the USSR all acts of the supreme
organs of state power and administration of the USSR and of other
organs formed or elected by the Congress of People's Deputies and the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
If organs of state administration, courts, procuracy or other legal
protection or application agencies, social organizations, or citizens dis-
cover discrepancies between a law or other normative act and the Con-
stitution of the USSR, they may bring this legal defect to the attention of
an organ entitled to submit the matter to examination by the CCS.
The CCS has the right to refuse requests to conduct an examination
on the ground that the request falls outside its sphere ofjurisdiction.1 08
Article 13 requires that the majority of members participating in the ses-
sion agree when accepting matters for examination upon the CCS's own
initiative.
The Chairman of the CCS exercises general leadership and calls
sessions at his discretion or at the request of at least three members.
The Deputy Chairman exercises functions transferred to him by the
Chairman and exercises all functions of the Chairman in case of the lat-
ter's incapacitation. Should both the Chairman and Deputy Chairman
be incapacitated, article 14 authorizes the CCS to elect from among its
members a temporary chairman.
the committees and chambers of the Supreme Soviet. Id. Deputy Suhangazin's pro-
posal to let citizens take complaints to the CCS was rejected. Id. at 2, col. 7.
108. This suggestion of Deputy Leskin was adopted by the Commission after the
plenary debate. See Kerimov's second report, Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2,
col. 7.
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Article 15 provides for the confidentiality of deliberations. Mem-
bers of the CCS must not publicly state their opinion on matters under
examination until a finding has been adopted.
Article 16 describes the procedure of preparing matters for exami-
nation by the CCS. The Chairman assigns the preparation of a matter to
one or several members and fixes a time limit that is not to exceed six
months.10 9 In the course of preparation, the members of the Commit-
tee have a right to solicit all pertinent documents and additional infor-
mation from state organs or social organizations, hear explanations by
officials of the respective organs and organizations, and consult with
scholars and practitioners.
Any officials of state organs and social organizations who refuse to
submit the requested documents or other information, or who commu-
nicate false information, will be subject to legal liability.
Article 17 sets forth the CCS's procedure for examining questions.
Within one month after the conclusion of the preparatory work, the
Chairman puts the matter before a session of the CCS. Members receive
the draft opinion and pertinent materials no later than fifteen days prior
to the session. The quorum required for opening the session is two-
thirds of the members. Sessions are generally to be open. They may be
closed to the public only to safeguard a state secret or other legally pro-
tected secrets. The right to participate and speak at the session is not
restricted to representatives of the organ which initiated the proceeding
in the CCS or the organ that issued the act under examination but is also
accorded to the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet; the chairmen of chambers, committees (Supreme Soviet), and
commissions (chambers of the Supreme Soviet); the Chairmen of the
Council of Ministers, the Committee of People's Control and the
Supreme Court of the USSR; the Procurator General; the Chief State
Arbitrator; and the Minister of Justice 1 10
The Chairman of the CCS, or a member authorized by him, first
delivers a report on the issue. Then the representatives of the organ
initiating the examination and of the organ that has issued the act under
examination may state their views. The CCS may decide to hear other
persons as well. Then a finding is adopted in a secret meeting of mem-
bers only. The finding is announced in open session and subsequently
published.
Article 18 defines the finding (zakliuchenie) of the CCS as a statement
of conformity or nonconformity of the examined act or draft (or its indi-
vidual provisions) with the Constitution or laws of the USSR and, in
appropriate cases, with international obligations of the USSR. The find-
109. Deputy Alekseenko suggested reducing this period to three months, but Ker-
imov in his second report replied that there may be difficult cases in which a shorter
period would not suffice. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
110. Deputy Shekhovtsov proposed to extend this right to all people's deputies of
the USSR. Gorbachev rejected the idea but suggested that individual deputies might
be invited as guests. Id. col. 4.
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ing must consist of a reasoned written opinion. It is adopted by a simple
majority of the total membership (i.e., at least fourteen out of twenty-
seven).1 11 Members have no right to abstain from voting. In case of a
tie, the Chairman casts the deciding vote. Dissenting opinions may be
put in writing and will be attached to the finding.
Once the CCS makes a determination as to the legality of a congres-
sional act, whether it is already adopted or is still under consideration,
the supervisory body must submit its findings to the Congress pursuant
to article 19. If the CCS has made determinations affecting the constitu-
tions or laws of union republics, it may submit these findings to either
the Congress or to the Supreme Soviet. These findings do not suspend
the applicability of USSR laws or other adopted acts of the Congress,
and they do not suspend the effect of republic constitutions or individ-
ual provisions therein.' 12 If the CCS makes a finding of constitutional
nonconformity with regard to congressional acts or republic constitu-
tions (or individual provisions therein), the Congress may reject the
finding upon a two-thirds majority vote (i.e., 1,500 of 2,250) at the fol-
lowing congressional session.
According to article 20, the CCS must communicate its findings to
the organ that issued the act, the organ on whose initiative the act was
examined, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
Article 21 establishes that, with the exception of the acts mentioned
in article 19, a finding of non-conformity with the Constitution or laws
of the USSR suspends the applicability of an act or any of its individual
provisions until the constitutional infirmity is eliminated. The finding of
nonconformity is published and circulated in the same procedure as the
suspended act.
The Law is less patient when it comes to protecting human rights.
If the CCS finds that a normative legal act or any of its individual provi-
sions violates fundamental human rights and freedoms secured by the
Constitution of the USSR or by international acts to which the USSR is a
party, the act or provision is immediately deemed invalid.
Article 22 addresses the procedure for eliminating the nonconform-
ity of a legal act with the Constitution and laws of the USSR. The organ
that issued the act in question has a three-month period to make the
appropriate changes. If necessary, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
may extend this period."13 If the nonconformity is not rectified within
the established period, the CCS may request that the Congress, the
Supreme Soviet, or the Council of Ministers change the nonconforming
I 11. The quorum was raised to this level from the original text (majority of those
present) at the suggestion of Deputy Shekhovtsov following Kerimov's second
report. Id col. 3.
112. Deputy Sobchak had suggested to give the CGS the power to suspend not
only laws but also constitutions of republics. The Baltic republics strongly opposed
this idea, and the Commission adopted a compromise solution. Id. col. 1.
113. In the discussion of Kerimov's second report, Deputy Alekseenko proposed
to let the CCS itself decide on the necessity of an extension, and Kerimov seemed at
that time disposed to accept this suggestion. Id. col. 4.
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act. If the Supreme Soviet rejects the CCS finding, the matter is raised
before the Congress which will render a final decision. Upon a two-
thirds majority vote, the Congress may reject the CCS finding. Short of
this majority, the finding of the CCS will stand, and the act in question
will immediately become invalid.
Article 23, the last of the procedural provisions of the Law, provides
that the CCS may propose the preparation and adoption of legislation to
the Congress or the Supreme Soviet. Thus, the Law reflects article 114
of the Constitution of the USSR which guarantees the CCS (among a
great number of other bodies) the right to exercise legislative initiative.
4. The Status of Elected Members
Article 24 stipulates that, in the exercise of their duties, members of the
CCS are independent and subject only to the Constitution of the USSR.
They must neither ask for nor accept instructions from any state organ,
social organization,"14 or official.
Under article 25, members of the CCS may not serve as people's
deputies'15 or as members of organs whose acts are subject to constitu-
tional supervision."16
Members of the CCS have the right to attend the sessions of the
Congress, the Supreme Soviet, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
under article 26.
According to article 27, members enjoy immunity from criminal lia-
bility, from arrest, and from measures of administrative punishment
imposed by courts. The CCS may lift the immunity by a two-thirds
majority secret vote.117 There is no liability for views voiced or votes
cast in the CCS.
5. Other Matters of the Organization and Activity of the CCS
The Law lists several additional provisions of organizational impor-
tance. The CCS adopts its own Rules of Procedure under article 28.
Article 29 provides that findings and other materials of the CCS are to
be published in the legal gazette of the USSR, the Vedomosti S"ezda
114. Deputies Kirillov and Ananavichius had suggested that members of the CCS
should relinquish their Party membership. Kerimov rejected this proposal, saying
that the Commission assumed that its members would be honest people who would
not accept orders, and to deny them membership in social organizations would vio-
late their human rights. See Kerimov's second report, id. col. 2.
115. Prior to the adoption of the Law and the corresponding change in art. 125 of
the Constitution, Professor B. Lazarev considered such an exclusion unwarranted,
because under the 1988 constitutional amendments, the CCS had not been granted
supervisory power over laws of the Congress. It seems surprising that he did not
seem interested in strengthening the independence of the CCS from the Congress.
See Lazarev, Konstitutsionnyi nadzor [Constitutional Supervision], SOTS. ZAK. no. 7, at 3, 4
(1989).
116. Article 25 also excludes members from serving in leading organs of social
organizations. Cf Kerimov's reply to Deputy Kirillov, supra note 114.
117. The secret vote was introduced into this text on the proposal of Deputy
Plotnikov. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 8.
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narodnykh deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. The CCS is to estab-
lish a Secretariat according to article 30. Finally, the CCS is to use a seal
with the state emblem of the USSR, as provided in article 31.
B. The New Article 125 of the Constitution of the USSR
When Professor Kerimov, Chairman of the Commission of the Congress
of People's Deputies entrusted with drafting the Law on Constitutional
Supervision in the USSR, delivered his report to the Congress, he
explained that in the course of the Commission's work it had become
necessary to make some adjustments to article 125 of the Constitu-
tion.1 18 Additional changes were proposed by deputies during the
debate of the Draft Law that followed in the Congress, and a number of
these were subsequently adopted." 19
A structural change proposed by the Kerimov Commission con-
cerns the elections to the Committee of Constitutional Supervision.
The original article 125 of the Constitution, adopted on December 1,
1988, contemplated the election of a Committee for a ten-year term.1 20 In
order to ensure continuity on the CCS, the Kerimov Commission formu-
lated the new article 125 which provided for the election of individual
members to the CCS for ten-year terms. 12 1 Yet, neither the Commission
nor the Congress introduced language that would adequately provide a
constitutional basis for the five-year terms slated for half of the initial
committee members in article 6 of the Law122 and section 2 of the Intro-
ductory Decree. 123
The increase in the original number of members from twenty-one
to twenty-five was in response to a request in the plenary debate to add
four members from autonomous formations. i24 Whereas the old article
125 had spoken of fifteen "representatives" (predstaviteli) from union
republics to be included in the membership, the Kerimov Commission
rejected this idea. Members would, indeed, come from republics as well
as autonomous formations, but they should not be considered their
representatives. 1
2 5
The Kerimov Commission also introduced a number of interesting
changes in the list of functions of the CCS. In section one, the provision
that the CCS may issue findings (zakliucheniia) on the constitutionality of
draft laws of the Congress was expanded to include other draft acts of
118. Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 2, co. 3.
119. See Zakon SSSR Ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakh stati 125 Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo
Zakona) SSSR [Law of the USSR "On Changes and Additions to Art. 125 of the Constitution
(Fundamental Law) of the USSR"], Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 7.
120. See the English translation in 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. No. 1, at 103, 105 (1989).
121. Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 7.
122. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
123. See infra text accompanying note 141.
124. See infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text.
125. Izvestiia No. 356, Dec. 22, 1989, at 2, col. 6.
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the Congress as well. 126
In section two, an obvious gap in the old article was filled by includ-
ing supervision of laws (and other acts) already adopted by the Con-
gress. The original omission was apparently intentional in order to
protect the "supremacy" of the Congress.'
27
Section three in the new article 125 provides that requests for
supervision concerning any acts of the Congress can be made by at least
one-fifth of the members of the Congress (a provision which introduces
an important minority right), the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (a
provision which may constitute a significant step in the development of a
system of checks and balances), and supreme organs of state power of
the republics (a major enhancement of republic rights). The old formu-
lation concerning supervision over republic constitutions and laws had
not mentioned which organs could make such requests to the CCS. The
new formulation grants this initiative to the Congress, the Supreme
Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and supreme organs of
state power of the republics. It also specifies that the respective findings
of the CCS are to be submitted to the Congress or the Supreme Soviet.
Section four of the new article 125 expands the scope of supervision
by adding that "international treaty and other obligations of the USSR
and the union republics" are to be examined with respect to their con-
formity with the Constitution and laws of the USSR. In addition, the
new article 125 provides that one-fifth of the deputies to the Supreme
Soviet and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet should be added to
those governmental organs enumerated in the old text of article 125
(namely, the Congress and supreme organs of state power of the repub-
lics) that may challenge acts and draft acts of the Supreme Soviet and its
chambers as well as acts of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. CCS
findings in these areas are to be addressed to the Supreme Soviet.
In section five, concerning the supervision of "normative acts of
other state organs and social organizations," the new article 125
restricts the jurisdiction of the CCS to those acts that are not subject to
Procuracy supervision pursuant to article 164 of the Constitution of the
USSR.128 This imposes a serious limitation on the supervisory activity
of the CCS to the extent that it prohibits the CCS from reaching below
the level of councils of ministers. Many illegal acts are obviously passed
by individual ministries (which will be subject only to Procuracy supervi-
sion). On the other hand, the new article 125 extends the right to direct
126. Under art. 108 of the Constitution, the Congress may adopt laws and decrees
(postanovleniia). For two recent examples of apparently unconstitutional Decrees of
the Congress see infra note 141 and notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
127. Cf Topornin, supra note 2, at 36; Lazarev & Sliva, supra note 19, at 14.
128. "Supreme power of supervision over the strict and uniform observance of
laws by all ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, institutions and
organizations, executive-administrative bodies of local Soviets of People's Deputies
collective farms, co-operatives and other public organizations, officials and citizens is
vested in the Procurator-General of the USSR and procurators subordinate to him."
KONST. SSSR (1977), art. 164.
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requests to the CCS to inciude all organs entitled to exercise legislative
initiative under article 114 of the Constitution.'
29
A separate subsection of the new article 125 summarizes those
instances in which the CCS may issue findings on its own initiative.
Under the old article 125, this right had been granted specifically with
respect to all situations listed separately in points 1, 2, and 4. Under the
new formulation of article 125, the CCS may issue findings concerning
"acts of the supreme organs of state power and administration of the
USSR and other organs formed or elected by the Congress of People's
Deputies of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR." This
formula prevents the CCS from taking the initiative with respect to draft
acts of these organs, to normative acts of republics and lower state
organs, and to acts of social organizations.
The old article 125 gave suspensive effect to all findings of noncon-
formity issued by the CCS. The new article 125 takes a step backward by
creating a category of non-suspensive findings regarding laws of the
Congress or republic constitutions. These normative acts are expressly
excluded from suspension in deference to the highest organs of state
power. The new article, like the old, contemplates that the very organs
that issued the unconstitutional and illegal acts should remedy the defi-
ciencies. In case of non-compliance, the CCS may seek to enforce its
findings on an organ or official by appeal to the appropriate superordi-
nate governmental body: the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, or the
Council of Ministers of the USSR. The new article specifies that a find-
ing may be rejected only by two-thirds of the total number of Deputies
in the Congress (i.e., 1,500 of 2,250). This suggests that in cases of
stubborn non-compliance, the CCS must pursue the question all the way
up to the Congress. But the Constitution makes no provision for situa-
tions in which the Congress remains inactive or fails to reach the two-
thirds majority required for rejection. It is without explicit constitu-
tional foundation that article 22 of the Law on Constitutional Supervi-
129. See the enumeration in art. 12 of the Law, supra text following note 107.
Under the "USSR Law on the Establishment of the Post of President of the USSR
and the Introduction of Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Funda-
mental Law)" of March 14, 1990, Constitution art. 125 (old) is now art. 124. Sections
2 to 5 of the article were reformulated to respond to the new office of President of
the USSR. In sec. 2, the President of the USSR replaces the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet as one of the organs entitled to challenge laws and other acts of the
Congress before the CCS. A new subsection empowers the Congress and the
Supreme Soviet to contest decrees (ukazy) of the President of the USSR as being
contrary to the Constitution or laws of the USSR. In sec. 3, the President of the
USSR and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet may ask the CCS for findings on the
conformity of republic constitutions with the USSR Constitution and of republic laws
with federal laws. In sec. 4, the President of the USSR assumes the right previously
granted to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to challenge acts of the Supreme
Soviet and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The respective findings of the
CCS are to be communicated to the Supreme Soviet or the President of the USSR.
Finally, in sec. 5, the President of the USSR, rather than the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, may contest other normative acts of state organs or social organiza-
tions. Izvestiia No. 75, Mar. 16, 1990, at 3, col. 5.
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sion in the USSR establishes the sensible rule that in the latter case the
act (or its respective provision) automatically expires.
The new article 125 contains a dramatic novelty that may provide
the starting point for a development in the direction of a genuine consti-
tutional court. It states, "[a]n act or its particular provisions violating
rights and freedoms of citizens lose their force immediately on the adop-
tion of the respective finding." The new provision is part of a subsec-
tion of article 125 that initially established the suspensive effect of all
findings, with the exception of those regarding laws of the Congress and
republic constitutions. Does the nullifying effect of findings on civil
rights violations extend to this basically "protected" category of norms
as well? Neither the Constitution nor the Law contains an unambiguous
statement to this effect, but the debate in the Congress, to which this
formulation obviously responds, points very strongly toward
nullification.' 30
C. The Introductory Decree
After enacting the Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR on
December 23, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies adopted the
Decree On Putting into Effect the Law "On Constitutional Supervision
in the USSR."''3 The Decree contains three sections. First, the Decree
orders the Law into effect as ofJanuary 1, 1990. The provisions of the
Law regarding supervision of the conformity of the constitutions and
laws of republics with the Constitution and laws of the USSR, however,
will become effective only after modifications have been made to the
part of the Constitution which regulates the national-state structure of
the USSR. 132 This delay is an exception; it is not to affect the exercise
of supervision over normative legal acts which violate the rights and
freedoms of citizens as ofJanuary 1, 1990.
Second, the Decree seeks to implement the principle of renewal of
the membership of the CCS established in article 6 of the Law. Immedi-
ately after the first election of the members, the Chairman of the Com-
mittee will determine by lot the thirteen members whose functions will
expire after five years. In subsequent elections, every member of the
Committee is to be elected for ten years.
Third, concerning the protection of their labor rights and other
conditions safeguarding the exercise of their functions, the members of
the CCS are placed on the same footing as people's deputies of the
USSR.
Aside from a political appraisal to be attempted at a later point in
130. See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
131. Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR o poriadke vvedeniia v deistvie zakona
SSSR "0 konstitutsionnom nadzore v SSSR", Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
132. This is Part III of the Constitution containing Chapters 8 (The USSR - a
Federal State), 9 (The Union Soviet Socialist Republic), 10 (the Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic), and 11 (The Autonomous Region and Autonomous Area).
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this paper, 13 3 all of these provisions invite critical comment from a legal
perspective. In the first section, the political compromise to suspend the
application of constitutional supervision over republic constitutions and
laws has been expressed in a legally questionable form. Is it possible to
suspend a constitutional provision by a simple decree (postanovienie)?
Furthermore, the language "this exception does not extend to the exer-
cise of supervision ...over normative legal acts violating rights and
freedoms" is not entirely clear. Does it provide an "exception to the
exception" referring to all normative legal acts of the republics? Or
should the sentence be read as a total exemption from supervision for
republic constitutions and laws and as a mere confirmation of the CCS's
role in the supervision of federal normative acts violating the federal
constitution andfederal law (and possibly also certain republic normative
acts below the level of republic constitutions and republic laws)?
Legislative history seems to confirm the first and broadest interpre-
tation. At the end of Kerimov's report on revisions proposed by the
Commission on the various drafts as a result of the preceding debate, 1
34
Gorbachev expressly asked Kerimov to explain the changes in this sec-
tion of the Decree. Kerimov replied, "[w]hatever exceptions we made,
they must not touch on human rights. Therefore we also proposed to
include subsection 3 in article 21 of the Draft Law... If by any norma-
tive legal act or its individual provisions, fundamental human rights and
freedoms are violated that are secured in the Constitution of the USSR
or in international treaties ratified by the USSR, then this entails the loss
of force of such an act or its individual provisions from the time of adop-
tion of a respective finding of the Committee."'
135
Perhaps it was for political reasons that Kerimov was less explicit
than he might have been, but he left no doubt that in protecting human
rights and freedoms' 3 6 the Committee would, from the start, scrutinize
both republic and federal law. And both article 125 of the Constitution
and article 21, section 3 of the Law suggest an intent to create a special
rule guaranteeing the highest possible protection of civil rights through
immediate nullificaition of all legal acts regardless of their level in the
hierarchy of norms. This was certainly not planned from the start, and
the import of this amendment was hardly realized by most deputies.
There was no outcry from the Baltic deputies that most of the suspen-
sion effect would thus be lost through the back door that opened the
way for civil rights scrutiny. ' 3 7 There was little protest from those who,
like Kerimov himself, had repeatedly insisted in the course of the debate
133. See infra notes 163-192 and accompanying text.
134. Afternoon meeting of the Congress on Dec. 22. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24,
1989, at 3, col. 7.
135. Id.
136. Article 125 of the Constitution, Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 8,
the Law (art. 21, sec. 3), id. at col. 5, and the Decree (sec. 2), id. at col. 4, uniformly
speak of "rights and freedoms of citizens."
137. Deputy Griazin (Estonia), who was obviously disturbed by this formula,
wanted to know how it would be interpreted and demanded further discussion of the
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that the political system was not yet ready for the establishment of a
constitutional court 38 which had the power to nullify rather than
merely suspend unconstitutional legal norms or even only admonish the
organs that had adopted them.1 39 What looks like unnecessarily
obscure wording, for which hasty legislative drafting should be faulted,
may in fact have been a clever stroke of political ingenuity on the part of
a coalition of politicians striving to establish at least some constitutional
supervision over the republics by the CCS right away14 0 and of jurists
who sought a constitutional court "with teeth".
Section 2 of the Decree is apparently unconstitutional. Article 125
of the Constitution makes no exception to the rule that the election of
every member of the CCS is to be for a ten-year term. Although this
exception is to apply only to the first election, this transitional provision
should have been enacted on the constitutional level.' 4 1 It will be inter-
esting to see the reaction of the Committee members whose work will be
subjected to such an inauspicious beginning.
Section 3 would seem to be important enough to be included in the
Law. It belongs there for systematic reasons, and it seems ill-placed in
an introductory decree. Surprisingly, provisions on this subject were
apparently included in the Draft Law as old article 27, but the article was
subsequently stricken "because it had the same content as section 3 of
the Draft Decree!'
14 2
III. Election of the CCS
A. The Electoral Process in Action
As soon as the three legislative acts had been adopted in the morning
session of December 23, Gorbachev, who presided over the entire dis-
cussion of these important issues, moved to the election of the Commit-
tee. He explained 14 3 that Professor Kudriavtsev, whom he had initially
proposed for the chairmanship, had suffered a serious illness and
begged to be excused, and that there had been other changes in the
Law. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 7, col. 4. But Gorbachev ended the debate
after three more speakers who dealt with other aspects. Id. at col. 6.
138. In rejecting the Komsomol request to rename the CCS the "Constitutional
Council" (Konstitutsionnyi sovet), Kerimov replied that this would signal the function of
a constitutional court and stated "[w]e are not ready for this yet. In time we will
effect this change." Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, at 3, col. 2.
139. Deputy Lauristin (Estonia) specifically criticized the newly emerging function
of a constitutional court in the jurisdiction of the CCS. Id at 6, col. 6.
140. Some jurisdictional problems might have arisen from the fact that the Presid-
ium of the Supreme Soviet retained those supervisory powers over republic law that
were not to be exercised by the CCS. KoNsT. SSSR, art. 119(5), reprinted in 15 REV.
SOCIALIST L. No. 1 at 97. But art. 119 was repealed by the March 14, 1990 constitu-
tional amendments, see supra note 129. Izvestiia No. 75, Mar. 16, 1990, at 3, col. 4.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 120-122.
142. See the Kerimov Commission proposals of changes to the Draft Law as
presented by Gorbachev immediately prior to the final vote on Dec. 23. Izvestiia No.
359, Dec. 25, 1989 at 2, col. 2.
143. Id. col. 5.
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original list of candidates as well. Some candidates had accepted other
functions in the meantime, and some republics had recommended other
candidates. Gorbachev then proposed Professor Sergei Sergeevich
Alekseev as Chairman, extolling his virtues as responsible, cooperative,
and a strong politician and jurist.144 And he then briefly characterized
Professor Boris Mikhailovich Lazarev's competence, whom he had
selected as Deputy Chairman. Concerning the twenty-one members, he
referred to written materials in the possession of the deputies.
Subsequently, Gorbachev proposed to include Professor Nikolai
Vasilevich Fedorov, a Chuvash by nationality, among the members of
the CCS in response to the demand of representatives from national-
territorial formations below the republic level (autonomous republics,
autonomous regions, and autonomous areas) to have a voice in the
Committee. 1 45 In doing so, Gorbachev tried to remove Professor Pisko-
tin from the list, pointing out how important it was for the Congress that
Piskotin would continue to function as editor-in-chief of the new journal
Narodnyi Deputat [People's Deputy]. This move would have preserved the
original constitutional number of twenty-one deputies.
But, voices from the floor and written requests passed to the presid-
ing officer delayed the voting process. The Estonian deputy Kiris with-
drew his candidacy because he lacked the official endorsement of the
Estonian Supreme Soviet. 146 Gorbachev wanted to proceed to the vote
and suggested to keep the "Estonian position" open. Then the Lithua-
nian delegation excused their candidate and did not recommend an
alternative. 147 Finally, an unidentified voice from the floor reminded
the Chairman that the thirty-eight autonomous formations of the USSR
had demanded four representatives on the Committee and that they had
been led to believe in the preceding debate that this request would be
granted. It was also suggested from the floor that this problem be
solved by merely electing the Committee Chairman right away and let-
ting him propose the members at the following session of the Supreme
Soviet which would confirm them.
14 8
During a regular scheduled recess, Gorbachev adopted all of these
proposals and put them to a vote. They were endorsed with overwhelm-
ing majorities. 149 The number of members was raised to twenty-five,150
and the number of members to serve only five years was correspond-
144. Deputy Alekseev, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Urals Divi-
sion of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, had won the respect of Gorbachev and
the Congress as Chairman of the Committee on Legislation, Legality, and Legal
Order of the Supreme Soviet. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. col. 6.
147. Id. col. 7.
148. Id, col. 8.
149. Id. col. 1.
150. Article 125 of the Constitution was changed with 1,604 votes pro, 64 against,
33 abstaining. The Congress forgot to change art. 5 of the Law, but Izvestiia No.
360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 7, printed the "correct" number of 25.
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ingly increased from eleven to thirteen. 15 1 Alekseev was elected Chair-
man1 52 without the usual questioning by deputies; Lazarev became his
deputy1 53 after giving a short recital of his career and a skillful answer
about his views on the much debated article 6 of the Constitution (i.e.,
the "leading role" of the Communist Party). One deputy noticed that in
article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Reglament) of the Congress
(adopted on December 20, 1989) 154 the numbers also had to be
changed from 21 to 25,155 and after this vote the Congress, without
debate, adopted the decree to give the Supreme Soviet the instruction
(poruchenie) to elect during its next ordinary session the members of the
CCS. 1 5 6 The Decree of the Congress of People's Deputies "On the
Election of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR,"
as published in Izvestiia,' 5 7 contains this instruction in its section 2.158
This section also spells out a mandate not mentioned when Gorbachev
read the text to the Congress: in addition to one member from each
republic, four members of the Committee should come from autono-
mous formations.
B. Assessment of the Electoral Process
The electoral process on December 23 had to be conducted under great
time pressure. 159 This may account for the seemingly desperate and
clearly unconstitutional decision to refer the election of the Committee
members to the Supreme Soviet. Article 108(11) of the Constitution
expressly provides for the election of the CCS by the Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies.' 60 The introductory clause to the enumeration of func-
151. Decree on Putting into Effect the Law "On Constitutional Supervision in the USSR,"
Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, col. 5. The need to change the number was
pointed out by Deputy Pronin, a metal worker. Gorbachev, as presiding officer, was
apparently surprised by this reminder: "Is it necessary to vote on this, too?" His
mind may have been distracted by the revolutionary events in Rumania, and it attests
to the political weight he attached to the issue of constitutional supervision that he
personally presided over the entire debate of the Congress on this matter. The vote
produced a majority of 1,642 for, 24 against, and 36 abstaining. Izvestiia No. 359,
Dec. 25, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
152. 1,644 for, 42 against, and 47 abstaining. Id col. 2.
153. 1,382 for, 219 against, and 121 abstaining. Idt
154. Izvestiia No. 363, Dec. 28, 1989, at 3, col. 7.
155. The change was voted 1,655 for, 34 against, and 25 abstaining. Izvestiia No.
359, Dec. 25, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
156. The decision was adopted 1,615 for, 66 against, and 40 abstaining. Izvestiia
No. 359, Dec. 25, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
157. Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta konstitutsion-
nogo nadzora SSSR, Izvestiia No. 360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, cols. 7-8.
158. Id. col. 8. Section I decrees the election of Chairman Alekseev and Deputy
Chairman Lazarev respectively. There was no vote on the entire text of the Decree.
Id. col. 7.
159. Originally the Congress had been scheduled for seven working days. See
Priniaty vazhnye resheniia " (Important Decisions Adopted), Izvestiia No. 319, Nov. 14, 1989,
at 2, col. 5 (correspondents' report). In fact it worked from December 12 to 24,
taking off only Sunday, Dec. 17.
160. "[T]he election of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the
USSR," KONST. SSSR, art. 108(11), reprinted in 15 REv. SocIAmsT L. No. 1 at 87.
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tions of the Congress in article 108 states that these are to be exercised
exclusively by the Congress. 16 Article 113 circumscribes the powers of
the Supreme Soviet. Item 20 of the article empowers the Supreme
Soviet to decide questions other than those enumerated in items 1 to 19,
unless these have been reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Con-
gress. 1 62 The Constitution contains no provision permitting the delega-
tion of powers from the Congress to the Supreme Soviet. Thus, the
"instruction" to the Supreme Soviet to elect the members of the CCS is
patently unconstitutional. Should the Supreme Soviet act on the basis
of this instruction (rather than deciding to refer the matter back to the
next session of the Congress), the activity of the elected CCS would be
seriously tainted by an unconstitutional election process. This unfortu-
nate beginning of an otherwise promising venture could be somewhat
offset by subsequent confirmation of the membership by the Congress.
But even such a step would merely follow the unconstitutional practice
of the Stalin and Brezhnev years to "legislate" primarily by means of
edicts (ukazy) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and then have
these acts subsequently endorsed and thereby raised to the formal level
of "law" (zakon) by the Supreme Soviet at its next session, although the
Constitution had given exclusive legislative power to the Supreme
Soviet in the first place.
IV. Comparative Evaluation of the CCS
A. Structural Aspects
The CCS has been established as a separate and independent state
organ. There is no provision in the Constitution or in the Law that
would make it "accountable" or oblige it to "report" to the Con-
gress.' 6 3 This is no mean accomplishment, given the general principle
of the Constitution to subordinate all state organs to the control of the
soviets. 16 4 The members of the CCS not only enjoy full judicial inde-
161. "The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR is empowered to take up for
its examination and decide any question assigned to the jurisdiction of the USSR."
Id. art. 108, at 85.
162. "Decides other questions within the jurisdiction of the USSR, apart from
those questions which are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of People's Dep-
uties of the USSR." Id. art. 108(20), at 93.
163. I would thus disagree with Lazarev, "Razdelenie vlastei" i opyt Sovetskogo
gosudarstva ["Separation of Powers" and the Experience of the Soviet State] in B. N. Topornin
ed., supra note 2, at 146, 157, who considers the CCS an instrument in the hands of
the Congress. But Lazarev was writing between the constitutional amendments of
1988 and the adoption of the Law on Dec. 23, 1989, and he may take a stronger stand
now that he has been elected Deputy Chairman of the CCS.
164. KONST. SSSR, art. 2, secs. 2 and 3, states "The people exercise power
through Soviets of People's Deputies, which constitute the political foundation of the
USSR. All other state bodies are under the control of, and accountable to, the Soviets
of People's Deputies."
Cf. also LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR of Nov. 30, 1979, art. 10, trans-
lated in W. E. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATxON OF THE USSR AND CONSTITUENT
REPUBLICS, VII-2 which states that "Judges and people's assessors of the USSR
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pendence (election to ten-year terms and immunity from arrest and
prosecution), but seem to be protected even more strongly than judges
against improper intimidation or removal from office. Whereas judges
may be recalled by the organ that elected them "for conduct incompati-
ble with their high rank" 16 5 and may also be subject to disciplinary lia-
bility for inappropriate conduct,1 6 6 there are no similar provisions for
members of the CCS. Article 27 of the Law on Constitutional Supervi-
sion extends the immunity of members to include measures of adminis-
trative punishment applied by courts and requires for the lifting of
immunity from prosecution the consent of two-thirds of the Committee
in a secret vote. 16 7 There is also an express protection of members
against liability for views voiced in the deliberations of the CCS.
These quasi-judicial aspects of the structure of the CCS appear to
be limited, however, by the composition and size of the Committee 168
which may steer its work organization and procedures into a more polit-
ical, quasi-legislative pattern rather than a predominately judicial one.
A smaller body would probably find it easier to establish its authority on
the basis of straightforward legal professionalism.
B. Functional Aspects
1. Examination of Sub-Statutory Acts
The most extensive and most important function of the CCS may well be
the examination of sub-statutory acts (podzakonnye akty) that violate the
Constitution or federal law. Professor A. M. Iakovlev estimates that this
area of supervision may account for ninety percent of the Committee's
future activity. 169 He and other Soviet scholars have repeatedly
deplored the fact that legislative power and legislative acts have been
inundated and paralyzed by normative material (frequently illegal) pro-
duced by the Councils of Ministers, ministries, and other executive
Supreme Court shall be responsible to and accountable to the USSR Supreme
Soviet." The USSR Supreme Court shall not less "than once during the period of its
powers submit a report on its activity to the USSR Supreme Soviet and shall system-
atically report thereon to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet."
165. Zakon SSSR o statuse sudei v SSSR [Law on the Status ofJudges in the USSR], art.
17(1), Ved. S'ezda Nar. Dep. & Verkh. Soy. SSSR no. 9, item 223 (1989); Izvestiia
No. 225, Aug. 12, 1989, at 2, col. 2. An English translation is located in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Series, item 89-160, Aug. 21, 1989 at 97.
166. Zakon SSSR o statuse sudei v SSSR, supra note 165, art. 18(1).
167. Prosecution ofjudges can be authorized by the Supreme Soviet under art. 6.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, supra note 165, at 94.
168. The draft of the 1988 constitutional amendments had proposed a member-
ship of 13 without reference to republic representation. Article 125 as adopted by
the Supreme Soviet raised the number of members to 21, including representatives
of each union republic. See KONST. SSSR, reprinted in 15 REV. SOCIALsT L. No. 1 at
103. Under the 1989 draft, members do not represent, but "come from" republics,
and the final version adds four more members from autonomous formations. Cf
supra notes 91, 125, 148-158 and accompanying text.
169. Izvestiia No. 357, Dec. 23, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
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agencies. 170 The CCS is expected to put an end to the arrogation of
power and its arbitrary exercise by executive organs and to re-establish
the superiority of legislation over executive rule-making. But it may do
so only with respect to acts of councils of ministers, not to those passed
by individual ministries. According to articles 125 and 164 of the Con-
stitution, the latter fall under exclusive Procuracy supervision. The suc-
cessful defense of this monopoly by the politically powerful Procuracy
imposes a serious restriction on the scope and effectiveness of the future
work of the CCS.1 71 I have little doubt that sooner rather than later the
supervision of all law-making by central executive-administrative organs
(including individual ministries) will be entrusted to the CCS.
The CCS is in a strong position to the extent that it may examine
these questions not only at the request of other state organs, but also on
its own initiative. 172 It is weakened, however, by the provision that it
may merely suspend but not annul unconstitutional or illegal acts of this
type 173 under article 21. The organ that issued the illegal act is given a
three-month period to rectify the situation. There may be reasons for
giving agencies an opportunity to correct their faulty norms, but it
should certainly be left to the CCS itself to grant this right as an excep-
tion. 174 Likewise, it seems improper to empower the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, 175 rather than the CCS, to extend the three-month
period. Predictably, the publication of the finding of the CCS (article
21) will put pressure on the respective organ, but there are insufficient
provisions for the case of non-compliance. The only option for the CCS
is to pursue the question up to the Congress of People's Deputies.
Soviet legislation on constitutional supervision could at least have
adopted the provisions that were adopted for the (pre-perestroika) Polish
Constitutional Court, that if the organ does not change its unconstitu-
tional or illegal act within three months, the act automatically loses its
force.' 76 The Yugoslav Constitutional Court, on the other hand, does
not suspend but rather immediately nullifies illegal or unconstitutional
sub-statutory acts. 1
7 7
170. Id. at 6, col. 8 and at 7, col. 1. See also Kerimov's report to the Congress, supra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
171. Note that the Polish Constitutional Court may examine orders and instruc-
tions by ministers. Ludwikowski, supra note 1, at 101.
172. Art. 12 of the Law.
173. Art. 21 of the Law.
174. Under art. 139(5) of the Austrian Constitution, the Constitutional Court may
decide that an illegal ordinance will expire after a period of time up to six months (or
in some cases, one year). See A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, 1 CoNsTrrtoNs OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.
175. Art. 22 of the Law.
176. Letowski, supra note 10, at 26.
177. Kristan, F'deralismus und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit injugoslawien, FESTSCHRIFT E.
MELICHAR 57, 72 (1983).
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2. Examination of Federal Statutes
In examining the constitutionality of federal statutes the CCS is
restricted by the principle of "supremacy" of the legislature. This prin-
ciple is acknowledged by all socialist countries, even if they have estab-
lished organs of constitutional supervision in the form of constitutional
courts. The Polish Constitutional Court subinits its finding concerning
unconstitutionality to the Sejm (lower house of parliament), which may
adopt or reject the view of the Constitutional Court. 178 The Yugoslav
Federal Assembly has a period of six months to bring its law into con-
formity with the finding of the Constitutional Court. In case of non-
compliance, the act (or its unconstitutional provision) automatically
expires.
17 9
The Soviet solution shows greater emancipation from the
"supremacy" of the legislature than the Polish model. The Congress of
People's Deputies needs a two-thirds majority, the same majority that is
required to change the Constitution, to reject a finding of the CCS. If
this majority is not achieved, the act expires.18 0 There is, however, no
provision that would let the act lose its force in case the Congress should
remain inactive.
3. Advisory Role
Western constitutional courts do not offer advice to the legislator in the
drafting stage. The original Soviet concept of the CCS under article 125
of the Constitution (as amended on December 1, 1988), however, envis-
aged such an advisory function with respect to draft legislation of the
Congress of People's Deputies. Laws which the Congress had already
adopted were to be entirely beyond examination by the CCS. These
laws have now been included in the scope of supervision, but the advi-
sory function concerning draft legislation remains a duty of the CCS.
The Polish Constitutional Court, on the other hand, does not examine
legislative drafts because the preliminary approval of a draft might be
prejudicial to a later examination of the adopted statute by the Court.181
One interesting function developed by the German Constitutional
Court that may play a role in the future work of the CCS is the "admoni-
tory decision" (Appellentscheidung).182 The German Court may, instead
of voiding a statute outright, appeal to the legislature (with or without
setting a time limit) to bring a statute in conformity with the constitu-
tion. This advice may contain more or less specific suggestions (includ-
ing choices) for legislative action. Since the Soviet CCS enjoys the right
to exercise legislative initiative it may occasionally choose this avenue,
178. Letowski, supra note 10, at 26.
179. Kristan, supra note 177, at 72.
180. Article 23 of the Law.
181. Letowski, supra note 10, at 26.
182. Rupp-von Bruenneck, Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court, 20 AM.J. INT'L
L. 387 (1972).
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rather than issue a finding, to address prospective advice to the
legislator.
The very idea that the powerful German Constitutional Court may
decide merely to admonish the legislator to change the statute, rather
than to immediately nullify its effect,' 8 3 must appear attractive to those
Soviet scholars (and CCS members) who are justifiably anxious not to
offend the supremacy of parliament, but who are at the same time work-
ing toward eventually establishing an effective Soviet Constitutional
Court.
4. Adjudication ofJurisdictional Disputes Between the Union and the Republics
One very important function of the Austrian and German constitutional
courts is to adjudicate jurisdictional conflicts arising between the federal
government and the member states and to pass on the non-conformity
of legal acts in the context of a federal union. This function has also
been intended for the Soviet CCS, but has been suspended until a new
constitutional model for the relationship between the union and the
republics has been devised. At this time it seems rather futile to specu-
late about the outcome of this intense political struggle. Gorbachev's
plea in the Congress to transfer jurisdiction in this matter from a polit-
ical organ, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to a legal mechanism,
the CCS, failed to persuade the advocates of republic sovereignty. The
Yugoslav model of a highly decentralized federation, in which the con-
stitutional court has no power to decide conflicts between the federal
and the republic constitutions (these conflicts are considered political
rather than legal questions),' 8 4 may itself prove unworkable with the
disintegration of the unifying force of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia.' 8 5 The Soviet Union may find it equally difficult to "legal-
ize" the resolution of serious controversies between the federal govern-
ment and the centrifugal republics that are increasingly insisting on
their sovereign rights. These "sovereign rights" have long laid dormant
under a constitutional pattern that was designed in and for a situation of
conflictless political and legal development in which all problems of con-
stitutionality could be solved by a highly centralized and authoritative
Communist Party apparatus.
186
5. Protection of Civil Rights
The boldest step taken by the Soviet legislature was the surprise "com-
promise" on Dec. 23, 1989,187 protecting civil rights against violation by
183. The Austrian Constitutional Court may suspend the expiration of an uncon-
stitutional statute for a period up to one year under art. 140(5) of the Austrian Con-
stitution. See A. BLAUSTIN & G. FLANZ, supra note 174.
184. Kristan, supra note 177, at 72.
185. On the recent separation of the Slovenian Communist Party organization
from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at A9,
col. 1.
186. Topornin, supra note 2, at 34.
187. See supra notes 130, 134-141 and accompanying text.
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normative acts. In this area, supervision over republic law (including
constitutions) is not suspended, and the findings of the CCS have imme-
diate nullifying force. There is no indication in the Law how the deci-
sions of CCS will be enforced, particularly if republic governments
should choose to ignore them. But from a conceptual point of view this
provision marks a further step from an advisory or admonitory to a gen-
uine judicial function of the CCS.
6. Adjudication of Individual Citizens' Complaints
One of the most prominent functions of Western (e.g., the German and
Austrian) constitutional courts is the adjudication of constitutional com-
plaints brought by individual citizens whose rights have been violated by
state organs. Under article 7 of the Principles of Legislation of the
USSR and the Union Republics on Court Structure,' 8 8 the ordinary
courts are to protect citizens against violation of their constitutional
rights by organs of state administration and officials. The USSR Law
"On the Procedure of Complaints to the Court Against Unlawful
Actions of Organs of State Administration and Officials Violating the
Rights of Citizens,"' 1 9 adopted on November 2, 1989, regulates this
procedure which does not, however, extend to normative acts of these
organs or officials.190 It also remains to be seen whether this protection
will be sufficient or whether, in the long run, this function will have to be
transferred to a special constitutional court in order to ensure its effec-
tive exercise.
7. Potential Role in Party and Election Disputes
There are other functions exercised by Western constitutional courts,
such as prohibiting political parties, deciding election disputes, or con-
ducting impeachment trials,19 that may, in the course of further legali-
zation of political processes in an increasingly pluralistic Soviet system,
188. Osnovy zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublik o sudoustroistve, Ved.
S'ezda Nar. Dep. & Verkh. Sov. SSSR no. 23, item 441 (1989); Izvestiia No. 321, Nov.
16, 1989, at 1, col. 7.
189. Zakon SSSR "0 poriadke obzhalovania v sud nepravomernykh deistvii organov
gosudarstvennogo upravleniia i dolzhnostnykh lits, ushchemliaiushchikh prava grazhdan, Ved.
S'ezda Nar. Dep. & Verkh. Soy. SSSR no. 22, item 416 (1989); Izvestiia No. 317, Nov.
12, 1989, at 2, col. 1.
190. Izvestiia No. 317, Nov. 12, 1989, at 2, col. 3. Normative acts (normativnye akty)
differ from individual legal acts (e.g. a court sentence or an order of an enterprise
director dismissing a worker) by their more or less general character, directed at the
regulation of a certain type of social relationship, and by their repeated applicability.
They range from the Constitution downward to orders and instructions of ministers,
local executive committees, etc. See A. S. PIGOLKIN, IURIDICHESKII ENTSIKLOPEDICHES-
KII SLOVAR (LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY) 254 (2d ed. 1987). Normative acts of
state administration below the level of councils of ministers are subject to Procuracy
supervision. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
191. For a survey of types and frequency of disputes before the German Constitu-
tional Court, see D. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 12 (1989).
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be included in the jurisdiction of a future constitutional court of the
USSR.
V. Prospects
The CCS of the USSR in its present form represents a temporary com-
promise solution in a rapidly moving process of political and legal
change. Like most legislation passed in this process, the institution of
the CCS, its functions, and procedures will undergo frequent amend-
ment and adaptation. Whereas some of the functions dealing with the
separation of powers between the Union and the republics may be sub-
ject to substantial alteration before they will become effective in a
revised system of federal (or confederative) relationships, other func-
tions of the CCS (such as checking the legality of decrees adopted by the
Council of Ministers of the USSR) may become immediately viable and
help enforce, in a quasi-judicial procedure, the supremacy of the Consti-
tution and respect for the statute in a well-defined hierarchy of norms.
They, too, will be refined and adjusted as the entire political system
moves closer to the Western style of conflict resolution through law.
This process will certainly involve a redefinition of the jurisdictional
spheres of the four organs most prominently involved with supervision
of legislative and administrative legality: the CCS, the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, the Procuracy, and the Courts. The predictable result
is likely to be a strengthening of the CCS and its ultimate restructuring
into a constitutional court. Already, the presently existing CCS has the
potential of making a significant contribution to the establishment of a
Soviet Rechtsstaat 192 (pravovoe gosudarstvo, a state under the rule of law)
and to the development of a more sophisticated Soviet legal culture.
192. On the origins of the notion of a Soviet state under the rule of law in the
concept of Rechtsstaat of 19th century German theory of state and law, see Nerse-
siants, Kontseptsiia Sovetskogo pravovogo gosudarsiva v kontekste istorii uchenii o pravovom
gosudarsive, in B. N. Topornin ed., supra note 2, at 45. See also Quigley, supra note 16.
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